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THE DIFFUSION OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
IN THE UNITED STATES

Fumie Murase, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1992

The study of diffusion of Japanese management practices in the
United States is required by growing Japanese investment in the
United States and the need of United States manufacturing to become
more efficient.

This thesis is based on a qualitative analysis of

five case studies of automobile assembly plants in the United States
utilizing cultural diffusion theory.
Most of Japanese production practices and some of their labor
management policies were originally transferred to Japan from the
United States.

After being modified in Japan some of these policies

are coming back to the United States with the transplants.

Other

Japanese management practices turned out to be unacceptable, but
these were either not essential to productivity or had functional
substitutes.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Although a lot of studies have been done about the diffusion of
Japanese manufacturing practices to the United States, growing J a 
panese investment in the United States and the need of the United
States manufacturing to become more efficient, require the continual
study of this subject.

Japanese business investment in the United

States has been growing because of the strength of the yen over the
past several years, expected United States protectionism, and Amer
ican efforts to draw Japanese investment into the United States
(Aoto & Miki, 1989, p. 70).

The number of Japanese plants which

came to the United States from 1970 to 1974 was 223.
increased to 330 from 1980 to 1984.

This number

During this ten year period,

the number of Japanese plants in the United States increased by 150%.
Moreover, about 55% of Americans favored Japanese investment in the
United States because they believed that it would create more job
opportunities (Aoto & Miki, 1989, p. 70).

However, 37% of Americans

expressed unfavorable opinions concerning this matter.

Also, almost

80% of the 50 States made efforts to welcome Japanese companies (Aoto
& Miki, 1989, p. 70).
This paper will examine the diffusion of Japanese manufacturing

1

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

2

practices within the United States in terms of the following issues:
1.

The relative ease or difficulty of incorporating Japanese

management practices and strategies.
2.

Which of these practices appear to be essential to the over

all success of transplanting Japanese
3.

business.

Whether some practices which may be essential in Japan might

have structural substitutes in the United States once their basic
function is understood.
This analysis will be based on general theories of cultural
diffusion, and a number of case histories of such transfers.
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CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

The Diffusion of Culture

According to The International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (Sills, 1986), diffusion is defined as the spread of cul
ture beyond the originating societies boundaries.

Diffusion is

different from acculturation in terms of the continuity and inten
sity of contact.

Diffusion generally involves the transfer of some

cultural ideal or symbols between societies, while acculturation
focuses on what happens to people as they adopt new customs and
tools.
Cultural elements selectively diffuse and change as they move
from one society to another.
function.

This change can be in either form or

Some cultural elements are chosen to be accepted from one

culture to another when they can be integrated and used in the adopt
ing culture.

Therefore, diffusion may be reciprocal.

For instance,

the idea of quality control of products originated in the United
States (but with limited utilization), was then diffused to Japan
and more recently, via Japan, came back to the United States.

This

process of cultural interaction suggests that there are many possi
bilities for cultural diffusion in the future.

Such diffusion, as

it expands during the present period of continued industrialization,

3
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may eventually lead to a unified or single world culture or economy.
The other side of the coin of cultural diffusion is rejection
of alien traits.

This phenomenon occurs because the traits are in

compatible with the preexisting customs and social structures of the
receiving culture.

For example, some Japanese owned companies in

the United States eliminated morning exercise programs.

Such pro

grams have been a very common practice in the majority of manufactur
ing plants in Japan.

Exercising together, which requires everybody

to move in unison, is not common in the United States except in the
military.

This Japanese custom is to practice group exercise not

only in the work place, but also at school and even in the community
(Buckley, 1988).
Prestige may play an important role in diffusion because people
tend to accept things promoted by prestigious people in spite of the
negative effects on them.

For example, the prestige associated with

wearing western style clothes has caused people in other areas and
cultures,

tropical

priate for comfort

countries

for instance, to wear clothing inappro

in their own climates. As

facturers gained in prestige in the world, it
panese automobiles

and their

manufacturing

Japanese auto manu
became easier for J a 
methods to be accepted in

the United States.
When new elements are adopted by one's culture, it creates new
problems since both the borrowed element and the receiving systems
may be changed.

Consequently, new ideas are needed to solve the

problems thereby generated.

Moreover, when some traits are adopted

from another culture, it seems to become easier to accept additional
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traits.

As a result, the elements rejected at first may be accepted

later because the social structure has been modified by the previous
ly adopted traits.

Therefore, diffusion seems to be an accelerating

and a cumulative process.

Socio-Technical System

Organizations and their environments are closely connected ac
cording to organization theory and industrial sociology (Florida &
Kenney, 1991a).

Thus, studying the diffusion of Japanese manufactur

ing practices to the United States requires the understanding of the
"socio-technical system."

The socio-technical system is the linkage

of social and cultural, human resource, and technical systems (Rehder, 1987, p. 55).

When Japanese management builds "transplants"

[transplanted manufacturing plants] in the United States, it tries
to accommodate human resources from the United States with management
practices from Japan.

An integration of management technique with

transplant culture is crucial for the success of these enterprises.
Some Japanese firms simply invest in ongoing American companies.

I

am, however, only focussing on cases of deliberate change in manager
ial practices.

The extent of difficulties associated with such inte

gration derives from sociocultural differences between the United
States and Japan.
As long as the organization is operated consistent with the
environment in which the organization was generated, it is unlikely
to produce a problem.

However, a problem is likely to occur when a

Japanese organization is incompatible with the environment of the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
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United States.

The traditional Japanese management style developed

for Japanese society may have to be more or less modified in order
to fit in the United States

socio-cultural background.

Therefore,

in order to determine which Japanese management practices are compa
tible with the United States' environment, it is necessary not only
to identify Japanese management practices, but also to understand
the Japanese values underlying these practices and American culture.
In the next section, the general cultural differences between the
United States and Japan will be briefly discussed.

The Cultural Differences

The United States has a very wide mixture of people by race,
religion, and other cultural backgrounds, whereas Japan is said to
be relatively very homogeneous.

The United States' population in

1989 consists of 77% Caucasians, 11% African-Americans,

7% Hispanics,

2% Asians and Pacific Islanders, 0.7% American Indians and Alaska
Natives, and many others (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1991).

On

the other hand, Japan's population contains less than 1% Korean,
Chinese and other ethnic groups (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

This homogen

eity was strengthened in 1640 when Japan turned away from a poten
tial involvement in world trade to close its doors until 1867 (Smith,
1992).
As a preponderantly homogeneous and "insular" country, Japan
has been characterized by the group in contrast to the emphasis on
individualism in the United States.

"Groupism"

(a journalistic

term increasing in use) has been cultivated in Japan because people

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

have traditionally lived lives based on a closely knit cooperative
social structure emanating from family and kinship relationships
which in turn was
resources.

based on labor-intensivefarming on limited land

In general,

since the Japanese people tend to place

greater emphasis on an emotional bond among all of citizens than do
their American counterparts, it is very difficult to separate oneself
from the group to

which one belongs (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

this influence is

based on emotional bonds, it is difficult to separ

ate intellectually the individual self from one's group.

Because

Also, b e 

cause this individual emotional identity is established as a group
identity or process, separating from the group can seem like any in
jury to or the loss of the self.

For example, Smith (1992) reports

that Japanese sailing clubs teaching a philosophy of harmony, hier
archy, and duty are similar to Japanese companies.

The Japanese

sailors who emphasize group conformity over individuality could not
win the recent American Cup yacht race since it requires each sailor
to make sudden good judgments on their own.
Although Americans make many groups for various and specific
activities, such as sports and volunteering, this type of group
participation is based on individual free will for a limited goal,
not so much on the feeling of unlimited obligation to the group or
social expectation as in Japan (Aoto & Miki,

1989).

Individualism in the U.S. is said to originate
extent in the frontier spirit.

to a great ex

Generations of Americans came to

the land of America for freedom of religion and new opportunities.
During the frontier period, Americans basically had to depend on
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their own judgments and actions to survive, even though helping each
other was also necessary (Aoto & Miki, 1989).
has disappeared,

Although the frontier

the frontier spirit is still a part of the American

people, who easily change jobs and residences for better opportuni
ties (Aoto & Miki, 1989).
Another important cultural difference is in the pattern and
basis of social communication.

Americans communicate based on di

rectness and explicitness, while Japanese communication is often
ambiguous and indirect.

For example, the Japanese may say "maybe,"

or "I will think about it,” instead of saying "no" because they pre
fer to avoid direct conflict and refusal.

This kind of prevarica

tion results from a complete effort to keep harmony in human rela
tions by avoiding direct conflict as much as possible.

However,

this Japanese ambiguity of expression is often perceived as insin
cerity or simply inscrutability (the mysterious orient) by Ameri
cans, who tend to prefer direct and candid expression (Aoto & Miki,
1989).

These cultural differences are also shown by the number of

law suits cases in the United States compared to Japan.

For in

stance, the United States had 40 times more civil court cases than
Japan in 1981 (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

Japan has many fewer law suits

due to the fact that it is perceived as shameful to make conflict
public.

Although conflicts exist in Japan, they are more likely to

be dealt with in a private and informal way.

Bringing the conflicts

into the public shows incompetence on the part of the involved mem
bers in terms of the primary goal of maintaining harmony.
This Japanese effort to keep harmony in human relations is also
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manifested in Japanese management practices, such as the consensus
decision making process.

The Japanese spend a long time building a

sense of trust before making a decision or contract with others.
However, this Japanese way is perceived as a waste of time for Ameri
can people (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

The Japanese rationale is that if

everyone involved in carrying out the contract was also consulted
and hence pre-committed, things would work out more smoothly once it
is in operation.

From this perspective, Japan seems like a less

authoritarian society than the United States, at least in its busi
ness subculture.
tation

Americans could respond that much of this consul

in Japan is carried out in a very hierarchal society in which

subordinates do not seriously challenge their superiors.

Whatever

the power

structure is in reality, Japanese workers tend to feel

that they

participated in the decision making process.

This seems

to be rare in the United States, especially when difficult changes
are being

carried out (Whyte, 1983, p. 2).

Japanese Management in Japan and American Management
in the United States

Although there are some differences in values between the United
States and Japan as discussed above,

there may be some Japanese val

ues which can be adopted in the United States.

Various Japanese

management practices may be different from the United States' prac
tices, but they still can function to achieve universal organiza
tional goals, such as high quality and productivity from the effi
cient operation of manufacturing.

The important value underlined

in Japanese transplant practices is to treat workers with enough
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respect for them to become fully involved and participate more ef
fectively in their work.

This is also accomplished by giving work

ers more responsibilities and helping them to have a long term per
spective on their company's goal.
In this section, general Japanese management practices will be
discussed, such as a high investment level, long term perspective,
early retirement age, lean production, promotion based on recommend
ation, wage with bonuses, bottom-up management and consensus deci
sion making, and the important role of engineers.

This discussion

is meant to clarify the function of each practice and the values b e 
hind it, while comparing it with general American management prac
tices .

High Investment Level

The Japanese investment rate in new plant and equipment is the
highest in the industrial world.

Japanese capital investment per

person is more than double that of the United States (McMillan, 1985;
Slayton, 1990).

This high investment level is supported by a high

savings rate among the Japanese.

The savings rate of Japanese

households is about 30% as opposed to less than 5% for the average
American (Cole, 1992).

Long Term Perspective

With the backing of a high investment rate, Japanese companies
have long term and closely tied relationships with their suppliers
as well as their own employees, while American companies tend to
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have short term relationships inside and outside of the organiza
tions (Tsurumi, 1978).
Japanese companies are said to have a longer term perspective
than American companies.

American management tends to focus on short

term results because protecting profits of stock holders is the most
important goal of management (Aoto & Miki, 1989, p. 78).

On the

other hand, most major Japanese manufacturing companies are owned by
banks.

These banks set up plants to build given products, not as

financial entities to be sold off for short term gains ("How Japan,"
1981, p. 57).

If Japanese companies experience difficulties or pro

blems, the banks can wait and continue to support the companies until
the crisis is over.

American companies tend to be forced to maintain

high profit levels, or financial support can be quickly withdrawn.
American firms are often sold as a tax credit for their losses to
other companies in unrelated industries (Aoto & Miki, 1989, p. 78).

Early Retirement Age

The retirement age in Japan is generally from 55 to 60 while it
is close to 65-70 in the United States (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

Japanese

companies generally offer retirement allowances, which, however, are
not sufficient to fund needed pensions, while pension plans are more
common in the United States.

Therefore, a lot of

retired

people

have to get jobs to supplement their pension, which, however, have
wages less than their previous jobs.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
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Lean Production

Lean production is one important example illustrating the simi
larity between Japanese management practices and pre-New Deal Amer
ican management strategy.

Verne (1990) stated that the success of

the Japanese auto industry was due to the use of "lean production,"
which meant elimination of as much waste as possible.
that Japanese
assembly line.

lean production

He also said

was as revolutionary as Henry Ford's

In spite of this revolutionary aspect, waste elimina

tion had in fact been a popular topic in the United States during the
1920s, the era of Japanese study and adoption of this American manu
facturing practice, according to Taira (1990).

Moreover, the concept

of Kaizen [continuous improvement] existed in the United States as the
"Continuous Improvement Program," CIP, before World War II (Schroeder,
1991).

Promotion Based on Recommendation

There are three characteristics of the Japanese job promotion
system:
1.

Promotion is recommended by the chief and evaluated by

personnel administration rather than being initiated by the person
hoping for a promotion.
2.

Promotion is based on evaluation within the company rather

than the qualifications the person acquired outside the company.
3.

The employees are eligible for promotion based on senior

ity (Aoto & Miki, 1989).
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In other words,

in Japan, no one applies for a promotion.

In

stead they wait for it to be considered based on seniority to deter
mine their eligibility for evaluation.

Wage With Bonuses

The seniority wage system is the common practice in Japan, which
accompanies lifetime employment and automatic promotion based on
evaluation and seniority.

Salaries are periodically increased.

Every spring, unions negotiate with managers to increase the total
personnel budget of the companies.
"Shunto," a spring labor offensive.

This negotiation is called
The rate of the increase is

also used as a standard for the companies without unions.

Moreover,

companies in Japan give bonuses which increase the base wages every
summer and winter (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

While bonuses are rare in

the United States, about 20% to 30% of total compensation comes from
bonuses in Japan.

In spite of this difference,

the proportion of to

tal compensation for direct, indirect, and legally required insur
ance differed little in manufacturing industries between the United
States and Japan (Hashimoto, 1990, p. 84).

Bottom-Up Management and Consensus Decision Making

Japanese management is said to operate, in general, from the
"bottom-up" as opposed to the "top-down" American style (Aoto & Miki,
1989).

One of the reasons for this may be attributed to Japanese

consensus decision making based on cultural emphasis of social har
mony.

Contrary to American companies, Japanese companies practice
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the belief that "(n)o matter what the group--from the smallest up
start enterprise to the largest multi-billion dollar multi
national- -nothing gets done until all the people involved agree"
(Byron, 1981, p. 57).
The ideal for the Japanese is to operate on the basis of con
sensus.

However, a question has been raised as to how consensus is

achieved in Japan.

Since the Japanese people tend to emphasize the

group and its harmony,

it is possible that they achieve consensus by

conforming to groups or authority that dominate groups.

For example,

Meryl Gordon (1992) said that "(s)ince harmony is considered such an
important quality in Japan, people are often reluctant to speak up
at meetings or say what they think" (p. 75).

If this is the case,

their consensus decision making may not be as democratic as it sounds.
Moreover, the drawback of consensus decision making is that it
may not work when responding to acute situations (Alston, 1986).
Consensus decision making may not necessarily encourage people to
have unique ideas or to adjust to unexpected crises.

If Japanese

transplants enforce group consensus decision making, American work
ers may be frustrated by this method because American culture gen
erally emphasizes individuality and creativity.
The role of middle management is very important in Japanese
companies.

Middle managers are expected to be active in planning,

making suggestions, and sometimes persuading top management to accept
their ideas (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

While there are more middle manag

ers in American companies than Japanese companies, an active role
for middle management is not common in the United States.

If
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American middle management became active in planning, it would be
perceived as revealing incompetency on the part of top management
and would lead to the collapse of the whole system.

The important

role of middle managers in Japanese companies is related to the J a 
panese concept of job assignment which is different from Americans.
This difference will be discussed in the next section in terms of a
smaller number of job classifications.

The Important Role of Engineers

In the Japanese automobile industry, engineers play more impor
tant roles in management thinking than most Western countries (McMil
lan, 1985).

In Japan, engineers are more directly involved in pro

duction process engineering in response to human resource and market
ing needs.

However,

the prominent role of engineers in Japanese auto

manufacturing plants is paralleled in the United States, but mainly
in the aerospace industry (McMillan, 1985).
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CHAPTER III

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The type of Japanese management practices transferred and the
degree to which transfer duplicates actual Japanese homeland prac
tice vary somewhat among the Japanese auto transplants in the United
States.

However,

in general the overall Japanese system of work

organization and inter-organizational relationship has been success
fully transferred to the United States environment, according to a
study by Florida and Kenney (1991).

Also, Rehder (1987) states that

automobiles built by the transplants are of comparable quality to
their Japanese built counterparts, with lower production costs than
those built by the Big Three (p. 61).
The success of transferring Japanese management practices did
not automatically happen.

Great efforts have been made to increase

the participation of American workers in overall production improve
ment activities, such as Kaizen [continuous improvement] and quality
circles.

On the other hand, wage and labor relations at transplants

have been modified from the standard Japanese way to include elements
of the United States practices (Florida & Kenney, 1991).
bonuses are rare in the
in Japan.

For example,

transplants unlike their counterpart plants

Moreover, Japanese auto companies "have taken great care

to select and even to alter the environment to make it conducive to
new organizational forms" (Florida & Kenney, 1991a, p. 391).

The

16
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environment in this case means the various elements to form corporate
culture, such as selection of sites, and employees.

For example, the

transplants emphasize careful screening of employees who would be able
to work as a team, and carry out intensive job training to increase
the workers' participation and skills.
First, the specific Japanese management practices will be brief
ly reviewed, such as life-time employment, careful screening of em
ployees,

intensive training programs, a small number of job classi

fication, leveling practices,

total quality control, quality control

circles with team work and rotation, the Just-in-Time system, the
Kanban system, Jidoka, and company unions.

Secondly,

Japanese management practices will be discussed.

the origin of

Thirdly, examples

of Japanese management practices in American companies will be re
viewed.

Life-Time Employment as Opposed to Layoffs

Based on their long term perspective, major Japanese companies
practice life-time employment, with both management and labor shar
ing the same fate.

This life-time employment has been practiced in

Japan mainly since World War II.

There are two reasons accounting

for why life-time employment became a common practice in Japan:
1.

The companies

efforts to secure workers due to the scarce

work force during the era of high economic growth.
2.

The pressure from unions to improve the status and stabili

ty of workers at actual production sites (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

More

over, Japanese culture tends to perceive frequently switching jobs
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as unfavorable.

In addition, life-time employment makes it cost ef

fective to invest in employees by offering various training and edu
cational programs within companies.
However,

life-time employment as practiced in Japan does not

benefit a large proportion of the work force.

This is mainly for a

certain number of men who work for large companies (Martin, 1989).
Only 35% of the labor force benefit from life-time employment (Byron,
1989).

The two thirds of Japanese work force is composed of part-

time workers who do not get the benefits of full-time employees.

In

1987, among the work force, one third of all women, over a half of
women over age 65, and a third of men over 65 who were employed, were
part-time workers (Martin, 1989).

These temporary workers are the

ones who would be cut off at the time of down turns in the economy.
So, in Japan as in the United States, there are favored and unfavored
sections of the work force.

Nevertheless,

for the secure worker in

Japan, complete loyalty is always

expected.Even for part-time

em

ployees without benefits, a loyal

attitude is important and still

expected, even if it is not reciprocated.
Layoffs are much more common

in American companies than in J a 

panese companies for two reasons:
1.

American companies recruit employees who have ability and

experience anytime when it is necessary to do so.
2.

During the period of prosperity, there are many chances to

change a job for better conditions in the United States (Aoto 6i Miki,
1989).
However,

these two conditions are not common in Japan where the
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top one third of the privileged manufacturing sector practices per
iodic hiring of new graduates followed by life-time employment.
Although life-time employment is a characteristic practice in
Japan in the privileged sector of relevance to our study, Japanese
companies transferred to the United States do not always promise
life-time employment, but do make efforts to avoid layoffs as much
as possible.

American workers could probably become as loyal as

workers in Japan to the extent that they experienced a higher level
of employment security than their neighbors working for American
firms.

The Japanese transplants' efforts to avoid layoffs will be

described in later case studies in this paper.

Careful Screening

Japanese companies in Japan mainly emphasize hiring new grad
uates without experience, while American companies usually seek work
ers who already have some experience (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

Trial hir

ing is apparently used in American companies to decide whether the
person is competent for the position.

Instead of using trial hiring,

companies in Japan periodically hire new high school or college grad
uates in April every year through careful screening tests and inter
views.

Then, the companies are committed to providing their new em

ployees with whatever on the job training is required (Aoto & Miki,
1989).
There are four reasons why periodic hiring became common in
Japan:
1.

A serious deficiency in work force numbers during the period
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of the high Japanese economic growth.
2.

The big demands for high school and college graduates to

meet new labor requirements introduced with the mass production sys
tem.
3.

The acquisition of a low cost work force.

4.

The Japanese cultural emphasis on belonging to the companies,

which is related to the life-time employment (Aoto & Miki, 1989).
Furthermore,

four distinct characteristics of the Japanese hir

ing system are also important to the practice of periodic hiring:
1.

A tendency to emphasize the moral character of recruits as

against requiring prior training and job experience.
2.

The number of employees is decided not only to fill up

the

vacant spots, but also to be incorporated into the company's long
term plan.
3.

The hiring of new graduates from school.

4.

The authority to hire new employees is concentrated in

the

head plant which assigns workers to the branch plants (Aoto & Miki,
1989).
Although Japanese transplants in the United States do not always
practice traditional Japanese ways of hiring, they still seem to be
very careful in screening employees, as shown in the case studies la
ter in this paper.

Intensive Training Program

Intensive training programs for employees are very important in
Japanese companies.

In Japan,

it is not common to recruit qualified
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persons from outside the company to fill the vacant spot.

Companies

prefer educating and training employees within their own organiza
tions rather than hiring people from outside.

Moreover, the purpose

of training programs within the company is not only to teach the
knowledge and technique required for the work, but also to develop a
sense of unity among the employees (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

A Small Number of Job Classifications

Management in the United States makes a strict distinction in
assigning tasks within the organization system.

On the other hand,

the task assignment in Japanese companies is more flexible than in
companies of the United States.
to be flexible in their work.

Japanese companies expect employees
This expectation of job flexibility is

reflected in fewer job classifications in Japanese companies and few
er levels of administration.
reify tasks as jobs.

From a Japanese perspective, Americans

If there are lathes to operate, there must be

lathe operators who do nothing else.

The future of manufacturing

seems to lie in flexible systems which can restructure equipment for
different product quickly.

People must be equally flexible.

Total Quality Control

The concept of Quality Control originated with two Americans,
W. Edwards Deming and J. M. Jurdan, who were
statistics.

experts in applied

Deming and Jurdan went to Japan to lecture about the

development of wartime industrial standards in the U.S.
1985).

(McMillan,

At the same time, Japanese industrialists came to the United
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States to learn about quality control.

The United States at that

time practiced a type of quality control in which line managers and
engineering staff had 85% of the responsibility and plant workers had
only 15% (McMillan, 1985).

Japanese industrialists modified American

quality control by giving greater responsibility and information to
the shop floor workers.

In this way, the Japanese could prevent de

fects from entering the manufacturing process at an earlier stage
of production, thereby, achieving a higher quality at lower cost than
did American methods (McMillan, 1985).

Quality Control Circles With Team Work and Rotation

Quality Control Circles (QC circles) consist of groups of six
to ten workers.

These groups engage in activities, such as quality

control, cost saving, safety improvement, pollution control, employee
education, and energy saving (McMillan, 1985).

The QC circles anal

yze and discuss problems raised by either workers or management and
then make suggestions for actions.
who coordinates the group's work.

Each group is headed by a leader
The QC leaders are usually rotat

ed, and are often elected from among the group members.

Variations

in the use of quality circles exist among Japanese companies.
Leaders of Quality Circles play important roles for the media
tion of ideas between workers and management (McMillan, 1985).

The

Quality Circle leaders take ideas generated by workers in quality
control circles and present them to management.

According to M c 

Millan (1985), "(t)hrough QC circles, Japanese companies build

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

23

bottom-up systems of experimentation, constant improvement, innova
tion, and above all, quality and pride" (p. 169).

The Just-in-Time System

The purpose of the Just-in-Time inventory system [an aspect of
lean production] is to maintain the minimum amount of parts at the
work site of the final assembly plant, while suppliers make deliver
ies at a precise time during the day.

The delivery time has to be

not too early or too late, but just in time.

Buyers like Honda check

not only the quality of the delivered parts, but also the supplier s
delivery performance.

Prior to the Just-in-Time system, an on-time

system used to be practiced.

However,

"'on time' meant anything ar

riving up to 12 days ahead of the nominal schedule, and as late as
six days" (Raia, 1990, p.65).
Practicing the Just-in-Time system is not only effective in
reducing the inventory for the assembler, but also to produce better
quality products.

The Just-in-Time system made buyers reduce the

number of their suppliers.

For example, Ford "reduced its supplier

base by more than 40%” (Raia, 1990, p. 65).

There are four logical

points behind the Just-in-Time system:
1.

If suppliers are screened into a small number, then they

must be better suppliers than the unselected ones.
2.

If better suppliers, then fewer rejects, then better pro

cess controls.
3.

If better process controls, then less inspection (Raia,

1990, p. 71).
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4.

Because supplied parts are immediately used, "faults are

caught earlier and below-standard assemblers can be more easily spot
ted" (Alston, 1986, p. 56).

The assemblers work very close to the

small number of selected suppliers by providing necessary technology
and informa-tion.

In this way, cooperative, loyal, and long term

relationships between assemblers and suppliers are created in order
to achieve the Just-in-Time.
Due to the reduced inventory, small batches make it possible or
necessary to have frequent job rotation.
pected to be flexible in their jobs,

Then, the workers are ex

"The system can be successful

only if workers are willing to learn a number of different opera
tions" (Alston, 1986, p. 54).

Working closely with the suppliers is

also important to make the system successful because the system de
mands that the final assembler be able to rely on a smaller number
of, but more reliable suppliers (Alston, 1986, p. 56).

The Kanban [A Part Specification Sheet] System

Kanban is an inventory control and production system.

The word

Kanban means a small plastic plate or paper which includes all rele
vant information on each part.

This system is a combination of the

Just-in-Time delivery and a rigid scheduling flow to reduce waste and
inventory costs (McMillan, 1985).

The idea of the Kanban system was

brought to Japan by Tai-ichi Ohno, the Vice President at Toyota, who
was inspired by American supermarkets (McMillan,

1985).

American

supermarkets today use bar codes at the cash register to inform the
warehouse when to resupply.

At the American supermarket which
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inspired Ohno before the invention of bar codes system,

the super

market staff used to replace products when the shelves had empty
spaces or gaps.

Toyota applied this information system to the flow

of parts; the workers in the last stage of production dictate the
flow of parts needed from the prior stage.

The old system projected

material requirements from the beginning stage of production to each
subsequent stage.

The Kanban system includes Just-in-Time and so

permits the supply of parts just as they are needed,

Any stock pile

is perceived as waste in this system.
An interesting issue beyond the scope of this thesis is whether
the suppliers are now the stock pilers or whether they can gear up to
producing as well as delivering just-in-time.

If they are not, this

system represents the domination of the small suppliers by the large
assembler in that the costs of warehousing have simply been shifted
from the assembler to the supplier.

Jidoka [Bottom-Up Quality Control]

Jidoka can be literally translated as automation or advanced
mechanization.

However, Jidoka at the Japanese transplants means the

harmony of people and technology.

The production line stops by it

self in case of abnormal conditions.

Also, any assembly line workers

can stop the line when they find some problems,

such as bad quality,

insufficient equipment, lack of parts, or a breakdown of machines.
In this way, quality production is assured by people as well as
machines.

The important point is that the workers have autonomy over

the machines without being controlled by the machines.

The lowest
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assembly operators in this system have more authority than in most
American factories without this concept of Jidoka.

Leveling Practices

Japanese corporations attempt to minimize visual status differ
entials among employees by issuing the same uniforms, eliminating
special parking spaces and lunch rooms for executives, and calling
all employees associates.

In my opinion, these Japanese practices

are not necessarily the result of less hierarchy in Japanese compan
ies in spite of various leveling practices.

Japanese people seem to

be very conscious of rank among the workers.

This is a part of J a 

panese culture in which seniority and respect for elders is empha
sized.

For example, employees who have titles such as the chief of

a section, the director of a department, and the chairman are called
by their titles or last name with the titles, never by their first
names in Japan.

Calling people by position titles extends to social

situations outside of the work place.

In other words, Japanese peo

ple may rely more on terms of address to make status distinctions,
while Americans rely more on visual symbols.
So it is not a question of which people are more status con
scious, but how they express it.

The transplants generally minimize

both American and Japanese ways of expressing status distinctions, by
having common cafeterias and calling the co-workers by first names.
Thus, the status distinction is less at the transplants than in eith
er Japanese home plants or American owned companies in the United
States.

What may have happened is that Japanese managers were
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imitating what they understood to be a typical egalitarian United
States practice whereas they were actually responding to a high Amer
ican value which is more relevant to non-business organizations.

Company Unions

Japanese unions are said to foster a cooperative relationship
between management and labor since white and blue collar employees
are in the same union (Aoto & Miki, 1989).

Japanese unions are

organized per company in all locations, rather than being part of
national federations, as opposed to unions in the Unites States.

A

major criticism is that the cooperative Japanese unions do not pro
tect their workers as much as do American and Furopean unions (Sethi,
Nobuaki, & Swanson, 1984).

The Origins of Japanese Management Practices

Japanese management practices are based on a combination of
traditional Japanese paternalism, a pre-New Deal American management
plan from the 1920s, and the works council idea carried over from
Europe, also pre-New Deal in origin (Taira, 1990).

The " (character

istics of the Japanese employment system which are touted as sources
of labor efficiency and product quality are imported from America"
(Taira, 1990, p. 473).
Japanese employers sent missions to the United States and Europe
to study how Western countries dealt with labor, after labor arose in
Japan due to a militant labor movement in the 1920s (Taira, 1990).
One of the most important missions arrived in 1921.

This mission
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consisted of 24 top Japanese executives.

The members of the mission

were impressed by the National Association of Manufacturers of the
United States and became inspired to consolidate the National Asso
ciation of Industrial Associations in Japan.
sion influenced Japanese employers

The 1921 Japanese mis

labor policy by taking the ideas

of the pre-New Deal American plan, such as welfare capitalism, em
ployee representation, and company unionism.

Even after World War

II, Japan continually learned production techniques and processes
from the United States and modified them into the Japanese way.

Some

of these American practices adopted by Japan were not prevalent in
the United States (Taira, 1990).

For instance, the concept of qual

ity control was more welcomed by Japan at that time than it had been
by Japan's American counterparts.
In spite of the fact that Japan learned so much from the United
States, it is said that "(t)he traditional mass-production system
used by most United States and European automotive companies is vast
ly inferior to the production system at leading Japanese firms, such
as Toyota and Honda" (Verrer, 1990, p. E3).

The reason for this dif

ference may be explained by Japanese faithful implementation of basic
good management principles as opposed to the United States' loss of
that concept (Sethi et al,, 1984).
Japanese auto manufacturers make efforts to continually improve
product quality and cost effectiveness.
achieved by human resource policy.

These improvements are

No unusual or advanced technique

or methods are generally used at Japanese transplants in the United
States.

Improved Japanese management methods which make products
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with low cost and high quality are the result of an accumulation of
small innovations over a long period of time which is sometimes re
ferred to a process engineering (Monden, Shibakawa, Takayanagi, &
Nagao, 1985).
In contrast, the United States management practices seem to lack
some of the basic management principles concerning product quality,
work force, and a long term perspective (Sethi et a l ., 1984).

An

apparent major weakness of United States management practices is a
short run pragmatic approach.

American manufacturers focus on anal

ytic detachment rather than the insight that comes from "hands on”
experience and emphasize short term cost reduction through layoffs
of workers rather than long term development (Sethi et al., 1984).
McMillan (1985) also pointed out that United States corpora
tions emphasize buying and selling companies to increase share price
value gains in contrast to Japanese management practices of emphasiz
ing development of more efficient production systems (p. 331).

Amer

ican owners tend to sell their companies easily when crises come be
cause they treat manufacturing entities as financial assets rather
than productive enterprises, even though selling the companies could
be a bad idea for the long term effect on the company (Kusumoto,
1991).
Furthermore, scientific management methods used by United States
companies during 1920s assumed that lower level workers are stupid
and therefore must be taught to be submissive, as opposed to Japanese
management methods which encourage workers' participation (Alston,
1986).

In addition, McMillan (1985) stated that
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the point is not that United States or European firms don't
have good engineering--compare the technology and engineering
emphasis of a French car company like Citroen, for example, or
the fact that United States firms like General Motors and Ford
were two of the biggest investors in R&D, just before the
Japanese auto onslaught arrived in force--rather the point is
the need to integrate across functions.
(p. 332)
Cole (1981) found that there was no significant difference in work
attitude between American and Japanese workers.

The only difference

between American and Japanese workers was found in commitment to the
company: Japanese workers are more committed to their companies.
Japanese workers

loyalty to their company is the result of human

resource operation of the Japanese companies, such as job security
and seniority wage system.

Cole (1981), however, said that product

ivity derives not from workers' loyalty, but from Japanese institu
tional practices which encourage and reward workers for making these
contributions,

Japanese Management Practices in American Companies

Although Japanese transplants implemented many of their manage
ment practices in the United States, the question is raised whether
or not it is necessary to adopt the style of Japanese management
practices used at the transplants in the United States in order to
make American manufacturing more efficient.

Since management methods

used by the transplants are, for the most part, applications of fund
amental, good management, as discussed above, it seems likely that
other forms of fundamental management practice could achieve the same
results for a given company, as long as the basic principles are
implemented.

For instance, Alston (1986) suggests that "each

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

31

American company has to adjust to the specific type of Q.C. circle
which best fits into its own organizational structure"

(p. 282).

"Many can use other forms of employee participation to achieve the
same advantages" (Alston, 1986, p. 282).
Alston (1986) presented several examples of American companies
whose management strategies are similar to those of Japanese manage
ment.

For example, the American company, Hewlett-Packard, began to

use suggestion boards after concluding that quality circles did not
work effectively at their plant (Alston, 1986).
allow workers'

ideas to be seen by everybody.

Suggestion boards
The supervisor puts

up responses to the suggestions on the same board within two days,
after deciding to accept them for further study, to implement them,
or to reject them.

Moreover, Hewlett-Packard makes efforts to create

an atmosphere which encourages informality and open discussion.
instance, all workers are called by their first name.
and snacks are offered by the company twice a day.

For

Free coffee

The company owned

recreational areas can be used by any employee at a low cost.

Also,

a policy of life-time employment has been implemented at the company
(Alston, 1986).
G.M.'s Livonia (Michigan) plant encourages the workers to make
suggestions.

In 1982, the Livonia plant saved 1.2 million dollars

and reduced the scrap rate 50% because of the workers' suggestions.
The Livonia plant promotes de-emphasizing blue-white collar divisions
by having the same cafeteria and no individual reserved parking (Als
ton, 1986).

Texasgulf Inc. also deliberately promoted a family at

mosphere among the employees by several

practices.

For example,
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the company not only offers college scholarships to employee's child
ren, but also encourages second-generation employment (Alston, 1986).
Apple Computer Inc. management practices walk arounds in order
to increase management visibility for their employees.

Through this

practice, familiarity is created between the managers and the employ
ees.

A feeling of mutual involvement and togetherness is then en

couraged to achieve the goals of the company.

Because of the prac

tice of morale building at Apple Computer Inc., the employee turnover
rate is about 1% as compared to 5% in California's Silicon Valley as
a whole (Alston, 1986).
These examples of management practices by American companies
convey the idea that it is important for the company to bring all
the employees together in order to achieve the goal of the organiza
tion.

The means for achieving organizational goals are not neces

sarily the exact same form as in Japanese practices. Keans can differ
in form as long as the basics are followed.

From this idea, the

question whether or not it is necessary for Japanese transplants to
use their management style in the United States may be pursued.

It

may not be necessary to practice exactly the same management form as
long as the fundamental management concepts are implemented.

In

other words, structural substitutes serve the same function.
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CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDIES

In this section, I will list the findings of five plant studies.
They are also summarized more systematically in Table 1 in terms of
the practices transplanted and the structural features of the plants'
setting which could have affected their success.

Mazda

Mazda, a Japanese auto company, built its first transplant in
Flat Rock, Michigan in 1984.

The company emphasizes interpersonal

relations as the key to productivity and competitiveness by practic
ing unusually careful selection of employees, heavy training, closeknit working relationship and work flexibility which requires all
workers to be accustomed to being rotated among many different kinds
of jobs.

A case study of Mazda by Richard Child Hill, Michael Inde-

gaard, and Kuniko Fujita (1991) will be reviewed in terms of this
company's inner organizational practices, relations with its union,
suppliers, government and

community.

Mazda decided to build its plant in Flat Rock after the Ford
Motor company closed its Michigan Casting Center.
between Ford and Mazda is important.

Mazda

The relationship

bought the land from

Ford and sought Ford's advice about labor and suppliers in the re
gion.

Mazda buys parts from Ford, while Mazda helps to increase
33
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Table 1
Summary of Case Scudles

Elements

Mazda

Nissan

Honda

NUMMI

Toyota

Layoffs

No

Avoid

?

No

Avoid

Careful
Screening

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Intensive
Training

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

The Number of Job
Classification

2

A

3

A

3

Quality Circle

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Rotation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Team Uork

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Just-in-Time

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Jidoka harmony
of machine and
people leveling

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Uniform

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No Special
Dining Room

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No Special
Parking

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No Special
Executive
Office

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Calling
Employees

Team
Member

Technician

Associates

Team
Member

Team
Member

Structural Factors
Affeccine Diffusions
Manager

Japanese

Americana

Japanese

Japanese

Japanese

Union

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

When Started

1987

1983

1982

198A

1988

Sice

Flat Rock
MI

Smyrna
TN

Marysville
OH

Freemont
CA

Georgetown
KY
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Ford's quality and productivity.
Hiring people at Mazda takes a five step evaluation over six
months.

The first step is two hours of written tests for mechanical

comprehension, oral comprehension and numerical skills.

The second

step is an interview about previous work experience [a step not com
mon in Japan as noted above].

During the interview, the applicants

are evaluated to see if they can fit into the Mazda environment which
emphasizes team work.

The third step is a social assessment in which

the applicants solve interpersonal problems in a given situation.
The fourth step is a medical examination of applicants in which,
among other things, substance abuse is checked.

The last step is a

physical assessment in which the applicants will perform given tasks.
There were 40,000 applicants for 3,100 available jobs (Hill et a l .,
1989, pp. 75, 76).
After applicants are hired through such a careful screening,
they go into a heavy training session which takes about three months.
During this orientation, the employees learn about the "kaizen" phil
osophy which is translated as a process of continuous improvement.
They are then assigned to a work site and evaluated for attitude,
aptitude and dexterity.

Before they are assigned to actual jobs,

they must learn the basic nomenclature of tools, and how to carry out
the work which means not one limited task but a wide range of jobs.
The workers are encouraged to participate in organizing their
jobs.
day.

They have a five minute meeting before the line starts every
A "diagonal slice" meeting is held with a cross section of 20

to 25 people.

Jobs are also rotated among workers in the line.
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There are few job classification at Mazda.

Therefore,

are trained to be multi-skilled and flexible.

the workers

Moreover, Mazda em

phasizes a social relationship which should be harmonious, and egal
itarian.

All workers are called members and wear the same uniforms.

However, this research report was unclear as to whether administra
tors are also called members by the workers or each other.
Mazda is the first Japanese owned automotive plant to have the
UAW or any union.

The UAW was selected by the employees and expects

participation in hiring and management committees of Mazda.

The wage

of Mazda's hourly workers was also expected to rise up to that of Ford
workers by 1990.

The UAW expects to understand Japanese industrial

relations from the insider's point of view, so that they will be able
to use it to organize future Japanese transplants.
Mazda is pressured by the United States government to increase
local content [parts made in the United States] because it uses a
much lower United States content to produce automobiles than the Big
Three.

Mazda selected their suppliers by getting advice from Ford

Motor Company in regard to prices and other related information.
Mazda then talked with the managers of the suppliers and evaluated
their quality control and productivity.

Mazda expects to have a

long-term relationship with its suppliers on the basis of mutual
trust, and sharing of resources, whereas the United States' compan
ies have a short-term perspective with their suppliers.

The United

States' auto parts suppliers are threatened by Japanese parts suppli
ers coming to the United States because the Big Three as well as J a 
panese transplants may outsource to non-unionized Japanese suppliers
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rather than the unionized United States' suppliers.
The state provided approximately 120 million dollars to subsi
dize Mazda's location in Flat Rock.

Although some people were con

cerned that the size of the subsidies might not benefit the state's
population, Mazda added up 15,000 to 20,000 jobs to the community
which had a fiscal crisis caused by the Ford pullout.

Even though

Mazda generally earned a favorable impression in the community, some
problems occurred, such as friction between management and labor and
between American and Japanese managers themselves, pressures to in
crease local content, employment of the minorities, product quality
and complications with their highly automated technology.
The friction between management and labor and among managers is
caused by the differences in work expectations and methods between
Japanese and Americans.

For example, while Americans view work as

something to support their lives, the Japanese see it as the most
important part of their lives.

American workers consequently com

plain that Japanese supervisors demand too much and set unrealistic
standards.

American workers are also not accustomed to the Japanese

team work style.
Equal employment opportunity is another issue on which the J a 
panese transplants are often criticized.

Some argue that the Japan

ese locate their plants where the black population is small and hire
a lower

percent of minorities even though Mazda executives say that

they would like to hire more blacks.

However, Americans recall the

statement by a Japanese foreign minister that the United States' work
force is inferior because it has so many minorities.
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In spite of the problems described above, Mazda's productivity
is better than that of most United States' owned assembly plants.
Moreover, the company is praised for its concern for safety and ef
forts to get the workers involved in the work organization.
In summary, Mazda transplant has two distinctive character
istics, compared to the other four transplants:

(1) the close rela

tionship with Ford, and (2) the presence of union workers as in the
case of NUMMI which is also related to an American automaker, GM,
while the other three transplants have no unions.

Nissan

Nissan, the second largest auto company in Japan, chose Smyrna,
Tennessee to build its transplant in 1980.
single foreign investment in Smyrna.

Nissan was the largest

Nissan's investment also

brought other Japanese and American parts suppliers to Smyrna.

The

report done by Jerry Buckley (1988) will be summarized.
The hiring system of Nissan was also highly selective, slow and
meticulous compared to the usual American firm s system or what would
be necessary in Japan.

However, Nissan's screening took only several

days which was much less than Mazda's six months.

Only one out of

ten applicants was hired after several days of pre-employment screen
ing in which the applicants' attitude toward work is checked.

Nissan

preferably hired people who had never worked in an auto company b e 
cause the company did not want the employees to have preconceived
notions about auto manufacturing or unionization.

The reason why

Mazda's screening was more careful than Nissan's may be that Mazda
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had a lot of applications from former Ford auto workers and was lo
cated in Michigan, a pro-labor union influenced state.

According

to Sethi et a l . (1984), Marvin T. Runyon, the president of American
Nissan, stated that
(h)uman resource selection and use is critical in a par
ticipative management system.
We're looking for people
who are capable of a a high degree of cooperation and team
work. We're looking for workers who are motivated by group
achievement as well as their own personal achievement.
And
we're looking for workers who share the company's commitment
to building the best quality trucks on the Market.
(p. 194)
Nissan's careful hiring system was followed by a large invest
ment in employee education.

Employees are expected to be loyal and

willing to learn a new system.

Three hundred and eighty-three em

ployees were assigned to spend six weeks in a training session in
Japan.

In addition to nine million dollars from the state, the com

pany spent fifty-four million dollars to train their new American
employees.
As in the case of Mazda in Flat Rock, Nissan has few job classi
fications.

The jobs for hourly workers at Nissan are classified into

only four categories.
trol.

All workers are responsible for quality con

Although product quality was a concern when Nissan first

started its production, five years later it proved to be as good as
in Japan.
Nissan hired an American manager to run its transplant in Ten
nessee.

This is an exception because Japanese plants normally use

only Japanese managers.

He developed a new management style which

has 55 involvement circles to discuss quality, safety and produc
tivity.

Every day, a ten minute group meeting is held throughout
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the plant before starting the line, whereas only a five minute meet
ing is held at Mazda.

During the meeting, the employees talk about

their ideas and complaints.

The American manager also decided not

to have a morning warm-up exercise because he thought that it would
be "a morale-depressing chore" in Tennessee.

Moreover, he insisted

on an American retirement plan at Nissan which begins at age 65.
Employees who served for 30 years get half their base pay for the
rest of their lives, whereas Japanese workers get a lump-sum payment
at age 55.

In Japan, these pensions are not normally sufficient, so

most 55 year olds go back to work in smaller companies for lower
wages, usually the parts suppliers.
Unlike Mazda in Flat Rock, Nissan is not unionized.

A lot of

workers at Nissan do not think that the UAW would bring any benefits
to them.

One of the Nissan's workers who expressed her opposition to

the union stated, "(e)verything would be cut and dried according to
the contract," and "there'd be more tension because people would work
as individuals, not as a team" (Buckley, 1988, p. 54).
The relationship between Nissan and its parts suppliers is sim
ilar to that between Mazda and its suppliers.
based on a long term perspective.
produced by the United States

The relationship is

Nissan is likely to reject parts

owned companies more often than parts

from Japanese owned plants in the United States.

However, Japanese

companies in the United States are generally increasing the content
of auto parts made in the United States because of the rising yen
and political pressure from the United States government.
Site selection was a crucial issue for Japanese companies facing
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racial conflicts in the United States.

However, according to Nissan,

Smyrna was chosen because of its central location, cheap land and low
labor costs, not because of the proportion of minorities.
17% of the work force is black at Nissan,

Actually,

in spite of the fact that

blacks are only 10% in the population of the area.
The Nissan transplant has some different characteristics from
the other four transplants:

(a) an American manager, and (b) some

status distinction practices, such as American style closed office
and separate parking spaces and no uniforms for top executives.

Honda

Honda built its transplant in the greenbelt community of Marys
ville in Ohio in 1982.

Honda was the first Japanese automaker that

started production in the United States, since Honda had already been
producing motor cycles in the country before making automobiles.

The

site, Marysville, Ohio, was selected because there was little in
dustry in that area and consequently the work force was fairly homo
geneous and has no experience in assembly line work (Oka, 1983).
Obviously, Honda preferred a non-unionized work force which would
make it easier to train the employees in the Honda way.
Honda in the United Sates developed good manufacturing methods
at an in-house technological development organization called Honda
Engineering of American Inc.

Their emphasis on continuous improve

ment may be seen in a quick and frequent change of die which is car
ried out a rate of 2 and half per day (Vasilash, 1988) and takes only
four to eight minutes (Moskal, 1990).

Also, they have three types of
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intensive quality control systems:

Q1 to check parts quality, Q2 for

testing every car before being shipped, and QCA for the road test.
Quality control staff are attached to every manufacturing department.
Therefore,

"any defects are being caught before they leave the plant"

(Senia, 1988, p. 51).
However, Honda seems to achieve high quality products not only
through the technological improvement, but also through
management.

personnel

Employees at Honda are treated as thinking as people,

not to work mechanically as machines (Oka, 1983).

Soichiro Honda,

the founder of Honda, said that "(n)o matter how much progress and
development is made in science and technology or social structure,
it must not be forgotten that it is men who operate them" (Alston,
1986, p. 94).

He also stated that "(d)on't be used by the machine,

use the machine" (Alston, 1986, p. 94).
Their personnel management highly emphasizes participation and
involvement by the employees by leveling and rewarding them.

The

leveling practices are such as calling the all employees associates,
wearing the same white jumpsuits, and not having
spots for executives.

reserved parking

However, promotion is not based upon senior

ity, which is a common practice in Japan, but rather based upon the
leadership and initiative shown by the associates (Moskal, 1990).
A Voluntary Involvement Program called VIP is an example of
encouraging employees
segments:

participation.

This program consists of four

quality circles, a suggestion system, quality awards, and

safety awards.

The employees are recognized and rewarded for their

achievements through this program.

In addition to that, associates
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are also encouraged to work in small teams.

Working in a small team

enhances the sense of participation and responsibility.
Moreover, Honda built its Associate Development Center (ADC) six
years after its the first year of production.

The center offers four

hundred courses to train and educate all of their employees.

Their

development training is designed to last 12 hours for production as
sociates, 20 hours for team leaders, and 30 hours for team coordina
tors.

There are four kinds of training programs:

fundamental administrative,
(Moskal, 1990).

(1) general,

(2)

(3) technical, and (4) quality circles

This general training has four purposes:

dress specific skill development,
ership and communication skills,

(1) to ad

(2) to expand an associate's lead
(3) to teach project-management

techniques, and (4) to develop step-by-step problem solving and de
cision making processes (Moskal, 1990).

The fundamental administra

tive training is for team leaders, staff, coordinators, and admin
istrators to teach how to appraise the performance and practices of
the other employees.

The technical training is complementary to the

other job trainings on welding hydraulics, and electrical mechanical
systems.
so that

Moreover, Quality Circles training aims at the team leaders
they can coordinate and train the other associates.

In

Quality Circles at Honda, the tools and money are given to the asso
ciates to carry out process improvements on their own initiative.
In addition to technical improvement and employee participa
tions, high quality seems to be achieved at Honda by working closely
with their suppliers.

Honda frequently makes informal visits to

suppliers in order to improve their quality.

Their suppliers'
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performance, measured by parts per million (ppm), has been improved
from 1800 ppm in 1986 and 500 ppm in 1989, to 250 ppm in 1990 (Raia,
1990).

The final goal is a single digit.

By improving the quality

of their suppliers, inventory time at Honda is planned to be reduced
from three hours to fifteen minutes (Raia, 1990).
The goal of Honda in the U.S. is to build a self-reliant man
ufacturing system in North America by the early 1990s (Raia, 1990).
Actually,

the domestic content of automobiles made by Honda in the

United States has been increased from 20% in 1982 to 71% in 1990.
Ironically, the automobiles produced by Honda in the United States
contain more parts made in the United States than do many models made
by the Big Three.

The success of Honda in the United States will

lead to more job opportunities for parts makers in the United States
and may help to revitalize the United States' economy.
In summary, Honda has three distinctive characteristics which
are different from the other transplants:

(1) the first Japanese

automaker starting its production in the United States,

(2) a 100%

of Kaizen (continuous improvement) implementation level, and (3) more
emphasis on individual initiative involvement as opposed to Toyota's
focus on team work.

NUMMI

The New United Motor Manufacturing Inc., a joint concern of Gen
eral Motors and Toyota, started in Fremont, California, in February,
1983, a year after GM closed the Fremont plant.

This joint concern

gave GM an opportunity to try some Japanese management practices, and
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Toyota to learn how to deal with the United States' makers and sup
pliers.

Also, Toyota appreciated the opportunity to obtain access to

the United States' market.
NUMMI has a lot of former GM workers and some of them were mem
bers of UAW.

Toyota was the first Japanese auto-maker which had the

UAW members in its work force.

However, NUMMI seems to have few ad

aption problems among its employees (Florida & Kenney, 1991a).

The

approximately 40 to 50% of Japanese Kaizen activities (continuous
improvement) are applied to the plant operation (Florida & Kenney,
1991a).

For example, a strict hiring system, a no-lay off policy,

few job classification, work teams, a Kanban system, and Jidoka are
typical Japanese practices used in NUMMI.
NUMMI reduced by 80% GM's number of job classifications (Florida
& Kenney, 1991a).

The current job classifications are four:

workers and three others for skilled trades workers.

team

Not only are

there four job classifications, the workers rotate their tasks every
time when they have a break or change (Florida & Kenney,

1991).

The

small number of job classifications makes the workers learn different
skills, and become more flexible at work.

Eventually,

this flexibil

ity gives the worker greater job security.
The big difference between NUMMI and GM is labor relations.

The

first vice president of UAW, Gus Billy, said, "(i)n the old plant you
had the union on one side and management on the other.

We continual

ly fought one another. At NUMMI, labor and management work together
on the basis of trust” (Hashimoto, 1985, pp. 1, 2).

The president of

UAW also stated, "(c)ompared to other GM plants, there is hardly any
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management here at all," and "(w)orkers are taking responsibility and
making decisions that would fall to management at a typical GM plant"
(Hashimoto, 1985, pp. 1, 2).

The International Labor Organization

reported the relationship between labor and management at NUMMI as
one of the most harmonious (Rehder, 1988).
Actually, NUMMI encourages workers to get involved and become
responsible through various practices.

For example, each worker in

a team is in charge of making a certain number of products and check
ing them out for defects so that he or she has to make better pro
ducts (Hashimoto, 1985).

However, responsibilities are given to

workers not just as individuals, but as a part of a team.

The work

team of six to eight people is responsible for making good quality
at a lower cost and the work site safe (Ulrich, 1986).

The three

teams are then headed by a group leader who motivates the teams.

One

of the former GM employees said "(t)he group leaders are now right
there helping on the production floor," and "at GM, they couldn't do
that or the union would get mad" (Kenney & Florida, 1991b, p. 26).
According to Alston (1986), the differences between American and
Japanese management are described by Roscoe Dye, who spent 21 years
as a maintenance line worker in American automobile plants, before b e 
ing hired by NUMMI:
[In American management style,] upper management treated you
as a lower grade of people.
If you didn't have the education
to communicate with those people, they wouldn t bring
themselves to talk with you.
[In Japanese management,] we
found that the upper management is now willing to talk to a
common working person like myself.
I'm the bottom of the
group.
If I can have anything to say, and they'll listen to
me, I'll feel like I ’m being appreciated.
(p. 93)
While working as a team is very important at NUMMI,

socialization
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among the workers is encouraged by giving each worker thirty dollars
per year to party with colleagues (Hashimoto, 1985).

Absenteeism

at

NUMMI is less than 5% (Ulrich, 1986).
Japanese practices seem to be working successfully at NUMMI,
according to Florida and Kenney (1991a).

One of the workers stated:

A lot of things have changed.
But see, you hear people talk.
You hear them saying once in a while, 'Oh, we're going back to
the GM ways.' I hope not.
That was rough.... I think to
completely bring back the Japanese way, Japan would have to
take over the plant completely and have nothing to do with
General Motors.
(p. 389)
Moreover,

"NUMMI workers complain that American managers still oper

ating in the GM style are a major obstacle to implementation of a
full-blown Japanese system that they see as more favorable to workers
than the old fordist system" (Florida & Kenney, 1991a, p. 389).
In summary, the distinctive characteristics of NUMMI arise from
the special combination of American and Japanese ownership unlike the
other four transplants, and the existence of a UAW union as in the
case of Mazda.

Compared to GM s former operation, NUMMI employees

seem to be happier thanks to the transferred Japanese management
practices.

Toyota

Toyota, the world's third largest motor corporation, built a
transplant in Georgetown, Kentucky,
NUMMI experience.

in 1988, after four years of its

Toyota has a technical center head quarters in

Torrance, California, while keeping the largest design staff in the
world which is twice as big as that of GM.
servative company in Japan,

Toyota, known as the con

implemented 60% of its Japanese Kaizen
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(continuous improvement) activities at its plant in the United
States.

Those Japanese practices include team work, quality control

circles, frequent rotation of jobs, the Kaizen concept, the Kanban
system, a well developed suggestion system, and close relationships
with the suppliers and communities (Florida & Kenney, 1991a; Kruar,
1989; Moskal, 1991).
The workers at Toyota are called team members as are Mazda's
workers.

However, the work force at Toyota is not unionized as it

is at Mazda.

Toyota carries out a lot of activities to build morale

among the workers.

For example, a personal touch program is made to

encourage the workers to socialize among themselvesafter work hour
by subsidizing the expense (Kruar, 1989,

p. 104).

While the workers are encouraged to be social,
to get involved in their jobs by working
is held to improve and redesign the work.

as a team.

they are expected
A daily meeting

Moreover, the "(t)eam

actually designs standardized task descriptions for their work units
and post them in the form of drawings and photographs with captions
at their work stations" (Florida & Kenney, 1991a, p. 387).

In addi

tion to their involvement in their work, workers on the production
lines may be recruited for middle level management positions in the
factory and the front office (Florida & Kenney, 1991a).
Toyota has very close relationships with suppliers.

Toyota set

up the Bluegrass Automotive Manufactures Associations for the local
suppliers in Kentucky (Florida & Kenney, 1991b).

Toyota closely

worked with Johnson Control's car seats supplier by implementing
Toyota's production system in terms of Kanban, Quality-Control
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Circles, Kaizen, etc.

Johnson Control can now deliver car seats to

Toyota in four hours (Kruar, 1989).
Toyota also developed a close tie to the community.

Toyota

stated that they "want to preserve the quality of life that attracted
it to Georgetown" (Kruar, 1989, p. 99).

For example, Toyota made a

million dollar donation to build a community center.

Moreover, Toyo

ta is involved in re-designing the curriculum at the local schools so
that the students could learn group-oriented behavior and problem
solving (Florida & Kenney, 1991b).

In addition to that, Toyota spon

sors the trips to Japan for the mayor, county executives, school
superintendent and other officials (Kruar, 1989).
The community, Georgetown, also made some change for Toyota's
coming.

They imposed a 1% tax on wages and salaries atop an identi

cal county tax.

By implementing the tax, the police force in the

city was reinforced with more men and vehicles, and the city hall was
renovated (Kruar, 1989).
In summary, the distinctive characteristics of the Toyota trans
plant are having previous working experiences with American auto
workers at NUMMI, implementing more Japanese practices in its own
plant than at NUMMI, and working closely with the local community.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS

In general, most of Japanese management practices are transfer
able to the United States, while Japanese labor management practices
are more likely to be modified or not transferred, but structural
substitutes are available.

In this section, various Japanese manage

ment practices are going to be divided into three categories:
practices which could or should be transplanted,

(1)

(2) practices need

ing transplantation but which, because they were unacceptable, have
been replaced by structural substitutes, and (3) practices which are
not essential for transplantation.
The Japanese practices which have been transferred to the United
States over the past decade include, Just-in-Time, the Kanban system,
Kaizen [i.e., continuous improvement], Quality Circles, Jidoka [i.e.,
harmony of people and machine], Team Work, rotation, and many process
engineers at production sites.

These transferred production prac

tices encourage workers' participation and involvement by giving re
sponsibilities and rewards so that the workers are motivated to do
their jobs.

These production practices are supported by some of the

Japanese labor management practices including careful screening,
tensive job training, and few job classifications.

in

The aim of these

transferred labor management practices is to make the various produc
tion practices possible by seeking cooperative attitudes from workers
50
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as well as training them to be flexible.

In addition to the prac

tices of screening and training employees, some practices which el
iminate visible status distinctions among executive and labor force
employees were also transferred, such as a common uniform, no special
parking or cafeteria areas, or separate office designations for top
executives.

The policy of not assigning separate offices to the ex

ecutives makes it possible for both management and labor to interact
with each other regularly.

These practices aim at developing famil

iarity between executives and lower level employees.

Concurrently,

cooperative relationships between labor and management have been en
couraged at Japanese transplants.
Life-time employment would have been appreciated by the workers
in the United States for their job security.

Although life-time

employment is practiced in Japan, Japanese transplants do not always
promise to keep their employees for the rest of their lives.

Instead,

Japanese transplants develop policies which are aimed at avoiding
layoffs as much as possible.

A policy of long-term employment makes

it possible to invest in the employees by giving in-house training
programs, which in turn creates an expectation of contributions of
skilled labor from the trained workers to the company's goal.
The Japanese practices which are not apparently essential for
transplantation include their retirement policy, and promotion based
on seniority.

In fact, they may not even be good for Japan.

The

Japanese retirement policy should not be transplanted because the
current retirement age of 55 to 60 in Japan is being reconsidered.
Because the population of aged people is growing, and because of the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

52

decreasing population of younger working generations, the retirement
age of 55 to 60 will need to be increased.

Japan will most assuredly

prolong the 53 retirement age so that the aged people can work with
the full compensation.

Also, the increase of a number of working

older people would be a good solution for the expected lack of work
force resulting from the low birth rate in Japan.

Therefore, since

new retirement policies are being developed in Japan, the current
policies should not to be transferred to the United States.
Promotion eligibility based on seniority may not be essential to
increase high productivity and quality, although it may help to avoid
conflict among the workers.

However, it does not directly encourage

employees to become better skilled workers.

If promotion were solely

done by seniority which helps to reduce conflict, the workers might
not be motivated to work hard.

Moreover, promotion based on one's

ability instead of seniority is becoming popular in Japan.

For exam

ple, IBM in Japan is one of the most popular companies for which new
college graduates wish to work because the company gives the posi
tions based on their achievement at work without being in the company
for years,

In other words, Japanese workers, like Americans, would

like to be rewarded for their hard work, even if the hard work takes
place in a short period of time.
Another Japanese policy which is not essential for transplanta
tion to the United States is consensus decision making.., even though
consensus is very essential in Japanese culture.
advantages in decision making by common consensus:

There are two dis
(1) the policy

takes a long time, and (2) it does not work for acute situations.
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Moreover, while consensus decision making in Japanese companies is
based on the group emphasis in Japanese culture, if this group emr“

phasis is excessively imposed to workers, the workers may be discour
aged from becoming creative which is a perceived weakness in the J a 
panese education system today.
While being multi-racial and multi-cultural produces many pro
blems for decision making policies in United States corporations,
such diversity also seems to be related positively to creativity,
which Japan's homogeneous consensus oriented society lacks.

Japan,

with half of the population of the United States, has produced only
one thirtieth the number of Nobel Prize winners as the United States
(Read, 1990).

Therefore, consensus decision making based on exces

sive conforming to a monotypical group should not be transferred to
the United States, but should instead be reconsidered for its dis
advantages in Japanese companies.
In addition to the Japanese companies' practices which should or
could not be transferred to the United States, work attitudes of J a 
panese workers are incompatible with those of Americans.

For exam

ple, Japanese businessmen very often go out to bars and restaurants
after work in order to talk informally
work.

about issues related to their

This socialization among Japanese workers is often considered

as an expected part of work to create a harmonious atmosphere at the
work place.

However, this kind of socialization at bars is done by

sacrificing the workers' own family life.

Many of Japanese wives

stay at home, being primary responsible for the children and house
holds, in spite of their husbands' neglect of family life.

However,
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American family life is already very weak with a 50% divorce rate.
Marrying one's employer in the case of the large number of two career
families would further increase the divorce rate in the United
States.

Although American businessmen sometimes have business talks

outside the work place, Americans do not sacrifice their family lives
as readily as do Japanese.

Therefore, practicing the Japanese form

of professional socialization at the transplants in the United States
may create a value-conflict between Japanese and American workers.
Stereotypical attitudes toward women and minorities are much
stronger than those in the united States.

Therefore, every effort

should be made to be sure that the negative attitudes toward women
and minorities in Japan not be transferred to the United States.

In

general, Japanese women are still expected to be subordinates at the
work place. Some companies still require women workers to serve tea
and clean the offices for male co-workers.

Even though Japanese law,

providing equal employment opportunities for men and women, was im
plemented six years ago in Japan, it will take a long time for Japan
to fully practice equal treatment of men and women at the work place.
Moreover, some minorities in Japan,
and Chinese]

[e.g., Koreans,

suffer from unequal job opportunities.

the Ainu tribe,
Although the

Japanese transplants in the United States have increased the number
of minorities, due to political pressure, it is still an assumed
reality that these companies actually do not practice equal job op
portunities for the minorities in Japan.
This study of Japanese transplants in the United States demon
strated the cultural diffusion theory.

The cultural diffusion theory
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states that the elements compatible to the receiving culture are most
welcome to be transferred from one culture to another, while the ele
ments incompatible to the receiving culture are most likely to be re
jected.

Moreover, some elements are reciprocal from one to another

culture.

Most of Japanese production practices and some of their

labor management policies were originally introduced to Japan by the
United States.

Now, after being modified in Japan, those policies

are coming back to the United States with the transplants.
Reconsideration of traditional Japanese and American manage
ment practices may be raised by examination of the transplant stu
dies.

Transplants are branches of corporate entities in which two

different cultures conflict, yet are meshed with each other.

The

struggle of the transplants may be used as an opportunity to reexam
ine both Japanese and American societies by studying the value sy
stems used in each country, and considering what can be improved for
each society.
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CHAPTER VI

THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE TRANSPLANTS AND JAPANESE SOCIETY

The future of Japanese transplants in the United States cannot
be easily predicted.

The future trend of Japanese transplants is

influenced by various factors, including acute trade friction between
the United States and Japan, increased numbers of automobile manu
facturers from other countries, specifically the heavy United States'
loss of automotive employment to Mexico and the changing values in
Japanese society.
Japanese society is urged to reconsider the values toward work
organizations which sacrifice various sectors of its society.

For

example, stereotypical attitudes toward women and minorities strongly
exist in Japan.

In addition to the discrimination toward women and

minorities, Japanese policies which pressure businessmen to overwork
have become problems for the entire Japanese society.

Some Japanese

companies have sensed these criticisms, and have started promoting
shorter work hours and full implementation of paid vacations for
employees.

Akio Morita, the chairman of Sony, suggested that "com

panies should build a more humane and fair society by, among other
things, lowering working hours, paying higher salaries to workers,
and increasing divided payments to shareholders" (McWhirter, 1989,
p. 46).

In order to achieve a "humane and fair society" in Japan,

labor management practices at Japanese companies may be forced to
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be modified.

In addition to the urge to change the corporate cul

ture of Japanese companies, Japanese auto manufacturers face some
difficulties in international trade.

In 1992, the Japanese govern

ment decided to regulate the number of Japanese automobile exports
to the United States from 2,300,000 to 1,650,000 per year.
while,

Mean

the Japanese government has not yet found an effective solu

tion for the trade frictions between the United States and Japan,
especially in the automobile trade.

Due to this regulation put on

the Japanese automakers by their government, Japanese automakers are
compelled to increase their transplants
States.

production in the United

This will further reduce the share supplied by United States

owned firms.

Meanwhile, the other Asian countries are becoming more

competitive, and the United States

automakers have been expanding

production facilities in Mexico due to a cheaper labor force.

With

increased competition in the auto industry, joint management may
prove to be one of the most effective ways to cope with international
competition.
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CHAPTER V II

THE LIMITATIONS OF SECONDARY QUALITATIVE DATA

This thesis was based on a number of references about

Japanese

transplant practices in the United States, including five case stu
dies.

Ideally, this study would benefit by additional time and money

to develop my own data gathering instrument and then carry out re
search on each of the five firms.

I recommend that future research

explore such issues a s :
1.

How does each firm decide which Japanese practices should or

should not be transferred to the United States?
2.

Who makes such decisions?

3.

Which of the practices that have been implemented in the

United States, have failed?
4.

What practices have been developed within the transplants?

5.

Whether or not the Japanese companies apply those practices

developed by the transplants to the operations of their own home
plants.
However, as it is I have had to apply an analytic framework
which cannot assert that it covers all relevant practices nor do I
have a clear definition of "success."

Some plants which may have

"succeeded" in producing good cars with happy workers may have lost
money or earned very little, but still "succeeded" in establishing a
"beach head” inside the United States for future expansion.

There
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are no data on the profitability of each plant separate from their
home office in Japan.

As a matter of fact, the whole issue of a

short or long term perspective is one of the differences which Japan
ese firms have with American companies.
Some of the reports used in this thesis were very scholarly and
critical, while other sources read more like public relations hand
outs.

Finally,

in order to facilitate this analysis, I have limited

my focus to automobile manufacturing and assembly facilities so that
plant comparisons would not be complicated by the differing demands
of dissimilar types of operations.
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